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BOOK REVIEWS
Religion, Morality, and Law. EDITED

BY ARTHUR

L.

HARDING.

Dallas: Southern

Methodist Press, 1956. Pp. x, 109. $3.00.
Less and less is the stigma of antiquarianism being attached to studies and
scholars who in increasing numbers are turning their attention to the philosophical and religious background of law. Religion, Morality, and Law represents the third in a series of studies emerging from the annual Conference on
Law in Society, edited by Arthur L. Harding, Professor of Law at Southern
Methodist University. The scholarly jurists whose views are presented in these
volumes have taken a scientific and modern approach to many fundamental
problems in jurisprudence, thereby filling a growing demand caused by the
long-standing disregard American law schools and law journals have had of research in this area of jurisprudence. The present volume differs from its predecessors in the series in that religion and morality, rather than the natural law,
are viewed as the basis of law.
This difference of emphasis is particularly patent in the first essay, "Can There
Be Morality without Religion," in which Robert E. Fitch disassociates natural
law ethics from either morality or religion, though natural law has been found
deeply bedded in the finest moral and religious traditions of the West since the
days of St. Paul. In the brief scope of his paper the author concentrates on the
empirical aspects of his hypotheses that there can be no morality without religion, tracing through history the failures of eighteenth century Enlightenment, English Utilitarianism, and secularized Protestantism. His arguments are
clear and incontestable. The case he presents against humanism is not so concisely formulated. Instead of demonstrating the inadequacy of humanism as a
sole basis of morality, the author pictures it as opposed to religion, and consequently disregards the great contributions Christian humanism has made to a
reasonable and realistic morality through its philosophy, its art, and its science,
the best of which have generally been accepted as an integral part of our culture.
For a brief exposition of the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of universal order,
reason, and permanent values as the foundation of both law and morality, Arthur
Harding's essay "Law without Morality" is highly commendable. The treatment
is broad enough to indicate the point of departure and insufficiency of other
theories that have influenced modern legal concepts: the various forms of determinism which have undermined the psychology of human choice in law and
morality; the absolutist's jurisprudence of John Austin which, reminiscent of
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, ultimately identifies law with the will or
aggregate commands of the sovereign; the pure theory of law devised by Hans
Kelsen, which logically seeks a more inclusive norm of law but is left wavering
without a solid basis. The ethical "right," essential to both law and morality
as a starting point, is equally important as a norm and guide of legal development. Without moral values law flounders in its legislative formation, its effective sanctions, and its administration. The dual role of law as the operation of
the eternal law in human society and as the governance of the people by the
people does not present a dilemma for the author. It is the only rational explanation of the source and function of law and morality.
A problem much closer to the legal practitioner is discussed in Wilber G.
Katz' paper, "Christian Morality and Criminal Law." The point at issue is im-
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mediately narrowed down to the purpose of legal punishment according to
classical Protestant tradition, originally expressed in the writings of Luther and
Calvin. Retribution, or the exercise of justice, for a criminal act freely chosen
is discounted as a basis for punishment in as much as the author attributes to
"realistic" Judeo-Christian tradition, supported by dynamic psychology, an insight into human nature which recognizes the relatively fixed character of youth
that renders personal responsibility inappropriate to the issue. To the extent
that criminal behavior is conditioned, responsibility is imposed upon the criminal with no fault of his own, only the vicarious responsibility of those determining his conduct. Rehabilitation emerges as the prime purpose of punishment,
with the prevention of crime as a necessary result. An indirect appeal is made
to the reader for support of, or at least sympathy with, a penal reform that will
embody the theories here expounded. Many will be slow to answer the appeal,
particularly those who are less deterministic in their ideas of human behavior
and are more appalled at the facility of delinquents and criminals to blame others
for their conduct. The evidence presented from Protestant tradition is far from
convincing; a stronger case can be made for the author's theories on the basis of
behavioristic psychology.
Natural law has never found a secure position within the framework of
Protestant theology. By theologians such as Karl Barth it is rejected when the
Christian is forced to make the inevitable choice between Jesus Christ and natural law. Ernst Troeltsch attributes to it an importance equal to the doctrine of
the Trinity. In his paper entitled "Theological Analysis of Natural Law" Joseph
D. Quillian, Jr. formulates a theory of Christian Natural Law that is essentially
different from the pagan concepts introduced by Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers. This natural law is "completely converted." Since human reason is
incapable of knowing the essential nature of natural law, basic natural precepts
are matters of faith rather than reason, part of divine revelation. This theory of
natural law is in complete harmony with the author's concept of the doctrine
of grace, pointing, as it does, to the benevolent sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man. Natural law has, however, lost its philospohical foundation;
it is no longer shared by all men; it is ultimately a religious law in the supernatural order of grace.
Regardless of the lawyer's personal position in matters philosophical and religious, he must eventually recognize the extent the present status of law has
been shaped by the philosophy and religion of Western society. It is very likely
that law will continue to be influenced by these same factors. Objective studies
along these lines, particularly if they are as thought-provoking as the ones reviewed here, contribute greatly, therefore, to the legal science of this country.
JOHN
-

T. RICHARDSON, C.M.*

Dean of the Graduate School, De Paul University.

The FederalLoyalty-Security Program: Report of the Special Committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. New York: Dodd, Mead &
Co., 1956. Pp. xxxvi, 289. $5.00.
Now that the tumultuous excitement and near-hysteria over communism in
government have subsided, it is possible to have a dispassionate, scholarly analysis of the problems raised by the Federal personnel security program. This book
supplies such a study.

